Assembly plants and power
Plants in the disaster zone close directly and rolling blackouts compound the outage: in April 2011 Toyota's global output fell 48.1% YoY and Honda's 52.9%, with nuclear shutdowns making power the binding constraint beyond plant damage.
Evidence: IndustryWeek on April 2011 output + CRS R41831 — Toyota −48.1%, Honda −52.9% global output; rolling blackouts compounded plant damage
Sole-source supplier chokepoints
Disaster-region makers of automotive electronics and specialty chemicals were 'not easily available elsewhere' — they kept plants below capacity after physical repairs were done and hit US plants weeks later.
Evidence: CRS R41831 — sole-source parts and chemicals not quickly substitutable; overseas plants slowed within weeks
Port disruption
Japan's auto exports concentrate at Nagoya, Tokyo, and Yokohama — the largest and biggest car-export ports — so a tsunami-damaged port throttles exports regardless of how fast plants recover.
Evidence: Nagoya Port Authority + JIFFA/MLIT throughput data — container and auto exports concentrate at three ports
Caveat: 2011 port-outage duration is UNVERIFIED — the exposure is structural, not measured
Overseas-plant knock-ons
As Japan-sourced parts ran short, Toyota suspended North American overtime, GM briefly shut a Louisiana plant, and Honda's Mexico plant considered furloughs — the supply chain transmits the shock across the Pacific.
Evidence: ScienceDaily/InvestorPlace on 2011 — US and Mexico assembly slowed for lack of Japan-sourced parts
Consumer prices
ALG measured +3–6% US transaction-price increases for affected models after Japanese vehicle production fell to roughly 40% of prior-year levels — the terminal demand-side link.
Evidence: ALG via AutoBlog — +3–6% transaction prices on affected models, 2011