container-shipping
INCOMPLETECoverage incomplete — the monitor is missing feeds for container-shipping, so no score is shown. Incomplete coverage is not zero risk.
Malacca carries 21% of global maritime trade by value (CSIS 2026, $2.46T). This models a disruption on the Ever Given template — throttling and delays, not a full closure, for which no measured analog exists.
The Strait of Malacca carries 21% of global maritime trade by value — $2.46T on the strict CSIS 2026 measure. No closure has ever been measured at Malacca, so this guide models a disruption on the Ever Given template instead: Suez's 6-day blockage in March 2021 causally raised the World Container Index 40% (peer-reviewed causal study) and produced multi-month supply-chain domino effects. Set how much of the strait's traffic is disrupted and for how long; the grading line is ≥7 consecutive days closed or throttled.
container-shipping
INCOMPLETECoverage incomplete — the monitor is missing feeds for container-shipping, so no score is shown. Incomplete coverage is not zero risk.
Monitor data as of Sep 24, 2026. Scores are observed readings, not forecasts.
Container reroute → freight spike
Ever Given's 6-day Suez blockage causally raised the World Container Index 40% (peer-reviewed causal-inference study, 99.89% confidence). A Malacca closure forces Lombok/Sunda detours with the same distance-cost mechanics.
Evidence: ScienceDirect causal study — +40% World Container Index, Ever Given 23–29 Mar 2021; Reuters — Lombok/Sunda bypass adds journey time
China crude supply shock
China imported nearly 8 mb/d of crude through the strait in 1H25 (WSJ), and 23.2 mb/d of total oil transited Malacca in 1H25 — the world's largest oil chokepoint (EIA chokepoints, Mar 2026).
Evidence: EIA World Oil Transit Chokepoints (Mar 2026) + WSJ — 23.2 mb/d total, ~8 mb/d China-bound
Caveat: UNVERIFIED as a measured closure outcome — structural from EIA/WSJ flow data; no pipeline alternative exists at that scale
LNG tightness to Northeast Asia
9.0 Bcf/d of LNG transited Malacca in 2023 (EIA 2024 chokepoints report), bound in large part for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
Evidence: EIA 2024 chokepoints report — 9.0 Bcf/d through Malacca
Caveat: UNVERIFIED as a measured closure outcome — the volume figure is measured, the price pass-through is not
Manufacturing supply-chain cascade
About 21% of global maritime trade by value funnels through one strait (CSIS); Ever Given showed a 6-day chokepoint closure producing multi-month supply-chain domino effects.
Evidence: CSIS 2026 — $2.46T / 21% of global maritime trade; cresteconomics on the Ever Given domino effects
War-risk insurance for the strait
Insurance withdrawal is the channel that empties a strait commercially before it empties physically — seen in Hormuz in 2019 and the Red Sea in 2023–25.
Evidence: Structural mechanism from the Hormuz and Red Sea analogs
Caveat: UNVERIFIED — no measured Malacca war-risk precedent located
Coverage incomplete — the monitor does not track exporter shares for container shipping. The exposure for this scenario is sized from the declared capacity snapshot in the “Adjust the assumptions” section below instead.
What passes through Strait of Malacca
lane throughput · not a goods flowThe strait's container exposure is a throughput share, not a country-to-country goods flow. Exposure here is throughput concentration — how much shipping uses the lane — not who imports from whom.
21%
CSIS, 2026
Share of global maritime trade by value passing through the strait
global maritime trade by value, ~$2.46T — All-vessels figure, not container-only.
41.12M TEU
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), 2024
Container throughput at the Port of Singapore (the strait's hub port)
annual port throughput, 2024 — ~90% transshipment; world's largest transshipment hub, 2nd-busiest container port. source
Container-only share of strait transits (TEU basis): unknown — No sourced container-only transit share found; the 21% is all maritime trade by value.
Container shipping is a service, not a goods flow: there is no honest HS-code bilateral to attach to a strait. So this card measures the lane itself — transit shares, port TEU, gateway concentration — each figure sourced with its vintage. What a disruption does to prices or shortages is not modeled here.
Historical check: No container shipping episode on record — no historical range to compare this setting against.
What share of the exposed capacity is disrupted.
Resolution: Share of strait traffic disrupted (littoral-state notices / AIS)
Global maritime trade transiting the strait — 21.0% of global maritime trade by value
Exposed under your assumptions: 21.0% (21.0% × 10000% severity) — verified route share factored in; see “What this assumes”.
The hatched area is modeled from your assumptions, not a measured outcome.
Source: CSIS 2026 ($2.46T)
Exposed ≠ lost — affected trade can reroute, draw stocks, or substitute. This sizes the exposure, not the damage.
Historical check: No container shipping episode on record — no historical range to compare this setting against.
Resolution: Consecutive days the strait is closed or throttled to commercial traffic — grading threshold 7 days (Ever Given lasted 6)
Your assumption — not a measured buffer.
Resolution: Assumed days of stockpile cover — an assumption, not a measured buffer
Covered by stockpiles— the assumed cover outlasts the disruption
What this would have meant
At these settings, about 21.0% of the world's container shipping exports would be exposed to the disruption, and the 60-day assumed stockpile cover outlasts the 14-day disruption.
No close historical match in our records — this scenario is outside our recorded experience.
Analog check
No close historical match in our records — this scenario is outside our recorded experience.
Want the full controls? Reopen container shipping on its commodity page.
For perspective, not prediction
Ever Given blocks the Suez Canal (March 2021)
Mar 23 – Mar 29, 2021
“A 400m ship blocked Suez for six days and 400+ vessels queued — oil wobbled $2.60 and reversed, and no verifiable agricultural price reaction followed. A timing shock, not a supply shock. Kept in the dataset only as an explicitly limited non-attribution case.”
Price moves were observed around the event — not proof the event caused the entire move.
Read the full recordRed Sea / Houthi shipping disruption (2023–24)
Nov 2023 – Apr 2024
“Houthi attacks rerouted a third of Red Sea container traffic and roughly halved Suez trade — and grain prices fell anyway on record supply. The freight shock lived in shipping rates, not commodity prices.”
Price moves were observed around the event — not proof the event caused the entire move.
Read the full recordCurated by Morrowfly — these are things to check, not monitor conditions.
Your call, in your words — recorded privately on this device, with a check-back in 30, 60, or 90 days.
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