Red Sea / Houthi shipping disruption (2023–24)

What happened

What everyone expected

Observed prices and measurement limits

Evidence and interpretation

How this record has changed

Living document — every material change is logged here, newest first.

1. New evidence2026-11-02

   The Houthi campaign escalated on land toward the Red Sea's southern gate. Reuters reported on Nov 2, citing four military sources, that Houthi forces have advanced to within 80 km of Aden, closer than at any point since 2015, after seizing the Al-Maqatirah district overlooking the Taiz to Aden road, a position that could help outflank government forces along the range overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The same day, the Houthis said they had launched drones toward Saudi Arabia's Dammam airport and targets in Jizan, with no immediate Saudi confirmation, and the Saudi-led coalition said it had intercepted a ballistic missile launched toward southern Saudi Arabia.

   Reuters, 2026-11-02 (Houthis advance to within 80 km of Aden, sources say) · Reuters, 2026-11-02 (Houthis say they launched drones towards Dammam airport, no Saudi confirmation) · Reuters, 2026-11-02 (Saudi civil defence all-clear; coalition intercepts missile toward southern region)

2. New evidence2026-10-29

   The shipping recovery held through late October even as the land war escalated. Lloyd's List Intelligence counted 305 Suez transits (27.6 million dwt) in the week of Oct 19 to 25, down 2% week on week but 35% above the weekly October 2025 average, with tonnage still 36% below pre-Houthi-crisis levels, and 295 Bab el-Mandeb transits (25.5 million dwt) in the week of Oct 12 to 18, with tonnage 46% below pre-crisis levels. Across Sep 28 to Oct 25 there were 1,195 Suez transits, and Lloyd's, citing UKMTO, noted no attacks on shipping since Aug 24, though suspicious activity was reported in the Gulf of Aden on Oct 28.

   Lloyd's List Intelligence, Red Sea Brief, 2026-10-29 (Suez and Bab el-Mandeb transit monitor)

3. New evidence2026-10-26

   The Houthi target list widened again, from the Yanbu port to the bypass pipeline infrastructure itself. Reuters reported on Oct 26 that the Houthis said they had attacked Saudi Arabia's East-West crude oil pumping stations and Riyadh airport, but that there was no immediate Saudi confirmation; the Saudi-led coalition said earlier that it had destroyed two ballistic missile launchers in Sanaa, including one used to fire a missile towards Riyadh that the coalition said it had intercepted. The East-West system is what moves Saudi crude to Yanbu for export without transiting Hormuz, so claimed strikes on its pumping stations are a step beyond the attempted strike on the port itself reported on Oct 16.

   Reuters, 2026-10-26 (Houthi claim on East-West pumping stations, no Saudi confirmation)

4. New evidence2026-10-19

   The Houthi campaign widened from shipping and airports to the Red Sea oil bypass itself. On Oct 14 the Houthis vowed to press on with attacks on Saudi airports and oil facilities and said they had struck Saudi Aramco's headquarters in Dhahran, and on Oct 16 a Saudi-led coalition said it had intercepted a ballistic missile headed for Yanbu, the Red Sea port that lets Saudi crude reach markets without transiting Hormuz, and destroyed two cruise missiles over the Red Sea; missiles also struck Aden airport the same day, with no casualties reported.

   Reuters, 2026-10-16 (Yanbu interception, Aden airport strikes) · Reuters, 2026-10-14 (Houthi vow / Aramco HQ claim)

5. New evidence2026-10-12

   The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement moved from paper to implementation. At an Oct 5 emergency meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan agreed to rapidly deploy military forces and capabilities in Saudi Arabia under the pact, which treats an armed attack on any of the three as an attack on all, and accused the Houthis of attempting to target Mecca and Medina. Turkiye's support so far is limited to air defense, intelligence, planning and logistics, with no combat troops reported and the Turkish parliament yet to ratify the pact.

   Reuters (via BusinessWorld), Oct 6, 2026 · Michael Hollister citing Reuters, Oct 11, 2026

6. New evidence2026-10-12

   Oil and freight markets reacted to the escalation. Brent rose to $105.48 on Oct 11 on Houthi strikes on Saudi infrastructure and tanker attacks near Oman and Hormuz; Goldman Sachs raised its December Brent forecast to $90 from $85, estimating a risk premium above $20 a barrel. VLCC benchmark rates hit a record $907,635 a day on Oct 6 with fixtures above $1 million, while Suez container transits jumped 62 percent week over week to 752,000 TEUs, the strongest post-disruption volume, suggesting container traffic was still recovering even as tanker markets seized.

   Reuters, Oct 11, 2026 · US Global Investors (USFunds.com) citing Bloomberg Intelligence, Oct 9, 2026 · IndexBox, Oct 10, 2026

7. New evidence2026-10-12

   Houthi retaliation escalated to direct strikes inside Saudi Arabia. King Khalid airport in Riyadh was hit for the third time in a week on Oct 10, with at least 12 to 13 killed and more than 300 wounded, and operations temporarily suspended; strikes were also reported or verified at Abha and Jazan airports (Jazan hosts a 400,000-bpd Aramco refinery), and the Houthis claimed strikes on a Rabigh refinery and a Khamis Mushait base. Saudi Arabia announced a military response, President Trump said Oct 10-11 that the US was considering joining Saudi strikes on the Houthis with no decision yet, and China condemned the attacks on Oct 12.

   Reuters, Oct 11, 2026 · Michael Hollister, Oct 11, 2026 · IndexBox, Oct 10, 2026 · AFP via GistAfri, Oct 12, 2026

8. New evidence2026-10-12

   The planned Saudi-backed offensive began on Oct 5, 2026: the internationally recognized Yemeni government announced a coastal push to retake Bab el-Mandeb and Mocha with Saudi air support (Riyadh said it hit hundreds of targets and sent naval forces into Hodeidah). Government forces reached Mocha's outskirts Oct 5, but the Defense Ministry's claim the city had fallen was not independently verified and the Houthis called it baseless. By Oct 9, ISW/CTP's geolocated assessment confirmed pro-government gains near the strait (al-Aradi, Jabal Kahbub, reported Perim Island retake) while Mocha's status and control of the island remained partly disputed, and the Houthis pressed on a second front around Taiz.

   Reuters (via BusinessWorld), Oct 6, 2026 · Michael Hollister citing ISW/CTP, Oct 11, 2026 · Red Team Analysis Society, Oct 8, 2026 (updated Oct 10)

9. New evidence2026-10-02

   Reuters reported Saudi Arabia is planning a major offensive to reclaim the Red Sea passage, led by Yemeni ground forces under Riyadh oversight with Saudi airstrikes. Options range from a focused Bab el-Mandeb coastal push to a multi-front campaign; more than 100,000 troops could be mobilized. The US is providing intelligence support; allies are not expected to play direct combat roles.

   Reuters via gCaptain, 2026-10-02

10. New evidence2026-09-30

    Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told the Shura Council the kingdom would respond firmly to any attack, pointing to a multinational defensive maritime coalition protecting international waterways and citing the trilateral Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan. Saudi crude exports recovered to about 5.4 million b/d in September from about 2.45 million in August, per Kpler data, as the East-West pipeline to Yanbu came back online.

    Global Oil Shock status page citing Al Jazeera Sep 30 and Kpler via Splash247, 2026-10-03

11. Correction2026-09-25

    Revised the lesson and interpretation after commodity-trader feedback: price-window comparisons do not identify causal effects, and a declining price does not establish that a supply shock had no supportive effect. Removed unsupported claims about offsetting drivers and clarified benchmark and window limits.

    Commodity-trader feedback supplied by the user; editorial review of bundled event observations (25 Sep 2026) · CME Group — Rough Rice futures specifications · CME Group — Wheat futures and options specifications

12. New evidence2026-09-21

    September 2026 brought a second Red Sea chapter: the Houthis seized Mokha port plus Perim and the Hanish islands and declared an embargo on Saudi shipping (Sep 10 statement), while Bab el-Mandeb commodity transits held near their 10-day average of ~27 vessels per day; at the same time Suez traffic rebounded — 1,232 transits (102.4m dwt) in August 2026, up 28% in volume and 43% in tonnage year on year, with July canal revenue of $505m (CAPMAS), the strongest month since Dec 2023 — partly as tankers rerouted around a disrupted Strait of Hormuz.

    Lloyd's List, 14 Sep 2026 · Reuters wire via SRN News, 11 Sep 2026

13. Correction2026-09-15

    An independent adversarial review replaced 'insulated by safe-passage assurances' with the honest account: assurances were given and shipments continued, but they were imperfect. No new outcome data was added.

    Morrowfly internal adversarial review (15 Sep 2026)

Transmission

• Wheat

  freight

  Potential exposure through longer voyages and shipping costs. The record does not estimate the effect on this commodity’s futures or delivered prices.

• Corn

  freight

  Potential exposure through longer voyages and shipping costs. The record does not estimate the effect on this commodity’s futures or delivered prices.

• Soybeans

  freight

  Potential exposure through longer voyages and shipping costs. The record does not estimate the effect on this commodity’s futures or delivered prices.

• Rice

  freight

  Potential exposure through longer voyages and shipping costs. The record does not estimate the effect on this commodity’s futures or delivered prices.

• container/tanker freight and marine insurance

  freight

  Contemporary reporting cited extra fuel costs (Xeneta); no matched comparison of freight, origin prices, and delivered prices is supplied. (Freight and insurance are not tracked commodity price series; the reporting describes rerouting costs and delays.)

Sources

• IMF · 2024-01-17 · Red Sea container shipping down 30% over attacks — IMF
• gCaptain · 2024-01 · IMF PortWatch: Suez Canal Trade Cut in Half
• Interfax · 2024-01-22 · Situation in Red Sea could provoke higher prices on grain market — analysts
• Barchart · 2024-01 · Wheat Collapses into New Year
• Reuters · 2024-04-25 · Wheat eases off two-month highs on large Russian exports
• CME Group · Reviewed 25 Sep 2026 · Rough Rice futures specifications
• CME Group · Reviewed 25 Sep 2026 · Wheat futures and options specifications