MORROWFLY
Guided scenario

What if energy infrastructure gets hit next?

The US-Iran war is underway since February 28, 2026; Hormuz tanker traffic has slowed to a trickle, and a mid-September 2026 drone attack shut Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, which had been moving 4-5 million barrels a day. This scenario models NEW physical damage to Gulf energy infrastructure beyond what has already happened — to processing plants, export terminals, or pipelines on either side of the Gulf. Tension, threats, or shipping rerouting alone do not count: the dial only counts operator- or EIA-confirmed physical capacity destroyed.

1The setup

The US-Israel-Iran war began February 28, 2026; by mid-September the Strait of Hormuz was largely shut to tankers (fewer than 10 transits a day, per Reuters) and the East-West Pipeline — the bypass carrying 4-5 million barrels a day, 4-5% of global supply — was shut by a drone attack that damaged three pumping stations (Reuters, Sep 17, 2026), with repairs estimated at 5-6 weeks. The Middle East produced 32.1% of world crude in 2025 (EIA, via Visual Capitalist); the Gulf top five were Saudi Arabia 9.51, Iraq 4.39, Iran 4.19, the UAE 3.82, and Kuwait 2.58 million barrels a day. The measured template is Abqaiq/Khurais, September 14, 2019: 5.7 mb/d knocked out, Brent settled +14.6% at $69.02, exports bridged by inventories, full capacity restored in about 11 days. The deeper-loss template is the Gulf War, which removed 4.3 mb/d for months as oil rose from $17 in July 1990 to $36 in October (CBO). Kharg Island and Ras Tanura are the canonical high-value targets on either side of the Gulf — named without export shares, which are unverified. Model NEW damage with the dial, not the destruction that has already happened.

Market check · Polymarket

What the market thinks

Saudi Oil Pipeline (East-West) restarts by...?

Polymarket · live contract

Saudi Oil Pipeline (East-West) restarts by September 30

30%

Saudi Oil Pipeline (East-West) restarts by September 22

7%

Saudi Oil Pipeline (East-West) restarts by October 31

73%

The market's favorite outcome is “Saudi Oil Pipeline (East-West) restarts by October 31” at 73% — you say the real chance is…

Your take lives on this device only. Illustrative — not a bet, not advice.

Closest live contract — when the already-shut East-West Pipeline restarts: the recovery leg of the September attack this scenario takes as given. It is not a market on new attacks.

$704.2K traded · resolves by 2026-10-01Odds as of Sep 21, 2026View this market on Polymarket →

Illustrative only — not financial advice, not a recommendation.

2Right now

crude-oil

INCOMPLETE

Coverage incomplete — the monitor is missing feeds for crude-oil, so no score is shown. Incomplete coverage is not zero risk.

Monitor data as of Sep 24, 2026. Scores are observed readings, not forecasts.

How the shock travels

Processing bottleneck

Abqaiq showed crude stabilization capacity, not wellheads, is the binding constraint: half of Saudi output transited one ~7 mb/d plant in 2019. The pattern repeated in September 2026, when the East-West Pipeline was shut by damage to three pumping stations, not wells.

Evidence: EIA Today in Energy, Sep 2019 — 5.7 mb/d knocked out; ~7 mb/d capacity at Abqaiq ≈7% of global crude capacity; Reuters, Sep 17, 2026 — satellite analysis showing three East-West pumping stations damaged

Spare-capacity evaporation

Saudi Arabia is the supplier of last resort, and most OPEC spare capacity sits inside the Gulf — damage there removes the market's buffer, repricing the whole forward curve.

Evidence: IEA World Energy Outlook 2024 via Safety4Sea — a Hormuz closure would strand “the vast majority of OPEC spare capacity”, most of it inside the Gulf

Caveat: Pre-war spare-capacity levels are stale — the 2026 conflict has already stranded and consumed much of the buffer; treat IEA figures as an upper bound

Hormuz → LNG and Asian crude

Qatar was 18.7% of global LNG exports in 2025 and ~20% of global LNG trade transits Hormuz; ~84% of Hormuz crude went to Asian buyers. The East-West Pipeline — the main bypass — is itself hit, so rerouting options are thinner than in 2019.

Evidence: IGU World LNG Report 2026 — Qatar 81.5 Mt, 18.7% of global exports; EIA chokepoints — ~20% of LNG trade via Hormuz; EIA data via SpeedCommerce (secondary) — ~84% of Hormuz crude to Asia

Caveat: Hormuz is already largely shut in 2026 — this models NEW physical damage, not first-time closure; the 84% Asian-crude share is secondary-sourced

Inventory drawdown bridge

Abqaiq's price spike decayed in days because Saudi inventories bridged exports during the ~11-day repair — duration, not size, sets the tail. In 2026 the bridge is already partly spent after months of conflict.

Evidence: Saudi officials via Reuters, Sep 2019 — customer supplies maintained from inventories; Reuters, Sep 30, 2019 — full capacity restored Sep 25; PVM Oil Associates via Reuters, Aug 2026 — “supply risk will persist and oil inventories will continue to deplete”

Product pass-through

Crude does not stay in the Gulf: EIA's longstanding guideline is that each $1/bbl of sustained crude change ≈ 2.4¢/gallon of US gasoline — a measure of pump-level exposure, not a price prediction.

Evidence: EIA Today in Energy — $1/bbl ≈ 2.4¢/gallon of gasoline (1/42 of $1, one barrel = 42 gallons)

3The exposure

Coverage incomplete — the monitor does not track exporter shares for crude oil. The exposure for this scenario is sized from the declared capacity snapshot in the “Adjust the assumptions” section below instead.

Trade map

Who ships it, who can’t do without it

2024 vintage · annual data, 1–2y lag

Sourced trade structure — the scenario’s shock geography at country resolution. Exposure, not a forecast.

Crude oil · Persian Gulf energy infrastructure

Top exporters

  • Saudi Arabia

    14.28% of world exports

  • Russia

    9.49% of world exports

  • United States

    9.33% of world exports

  • United Arab Emirates

    8.75% of world exports

  • Canada

    8.29% of world exports

Note: crude petroleum oils; refined products (2710) excluded

Exposed importers

Shocked exporters: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, IR

Strait of Hormuz

via Strait of Hormuz · 27% of global maritime oil trade (crude + petroleum products)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024

Everything through the Strait of Hormuz →

How we map this

Exporter and importer shares are 2024 vintage · annual data, 1–2y lag from UN Comtrade and OEC (BACI/CEPII); an importer counts as exposed when ≥20% of its crude oil imports come from a shocked exporter. The shock geography is the scenario’s own focus selection. Annual data with a 1–2 year reporting lag — the structure moves slowly, the prices don’t.

4Adjust the assumptions

Physical damage scaleAbqaiq-scale (2019)

Historical check: No crude oil episode on record — no historical range to compare this setting against.

What share of the exposed capacity is disrupted.

Resolution: Operator/EIA-confirmed crude production or export capacity offline (mb/d) — grading line 2.0 mb/d for 30+ days

Share of world crude production in the hazard zone

Middle East share of world crude production — 32.0% of world crude production

Exposed under your assumptions: 16.0% (32.0% × 50% severity)

The hatched area is modeled from your assumptions, not a measured outcome.

Source: EIA/IEA tabulation 2025

Exposed ≠ lost — affected trade can reroute, draw stocks, or substitute. This sizes the exposure, not the damage.

60d

Historical check: No crude oil episode on record — no historical range to compare this setting against.

Resolution: Days the damaged capacity stays offline (Abqaiq: ~11 days to full capacity restoration)

60d

Your assumption — not a measured buffer.

Resolution: Assumed days of stockpile cover — an assumption, not a measured buffer

Disruption timeline
090180270365 days
Disruption: 60 days
Assumed cover: 60 days — your assumptionYour assumption

Covered by stockpiles— the assumed cover outlasts the disruption

What this would have meant

At these settings, about 16.0% of the world's crude oil exports would be exposed to the disruption, and the 60-day assumed stockpile cover outlasts the 60-day disruption.

No close historical match in our records — this scenario is outside our recorded experience.

What this assumes
  • Exposure: Target share 32.0% × severity 50% = 16.0% exposed.
  • Uncovered days: max(0, 60 − 60) = 0.
  • Exposed ≠ lost: affected trade can reroute, draw down stocks, or find substitutes — this number sizes the exposure, not the damage.
  • Exporter share ≠ spare capacity: rivals may not be able to surge supply to fill the gap.
  • Combined share is the sum of the focus exporters' individual shares — a scenario hitting all of them at once.
  • Stockpile cover of 60 days is your assumption, not a measured buffer.
  • Results are physical-exposure arithmetic from your stated assumptions — not a price forecast.

Analog check

No close historical match in our records — this scenario is outside our recorded experience.

Want the full controls? Reopen crude oil on its commodity page.

5What happened before

For perspective, not prediction

What to watch

  • Operator/EIA/IEA-confirmed crude production or export capacity offline in mb/d — the grading line is ≥2.0 mb/d offline for ≥30 days
  • Consecutive days Hormuz tanker traffic is forcibly closed — the alternate grading line is ≥7 days
  • Reported damage to processing plants and export terminals (Abqaiq, Kharg Island, Ras Tanura) — track facilities, not shares; export shares for Kharg and Ras Tanura are unverified
  • East-West Pipeline repair status — Reuters satellite analysis (Sep 17, 2026) found three pumping stations damaged; sources estimate 5-6 weeks to repair
  • IEA/EIA-reported strategic inventory drawdowns — the bridge that decides whether the spike decays like Abqaiq's or tails like 1990's

Curated by Morrowfly — these are things to check, not monitor conditions.

Make it yours

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Read by a human · never auto-published

Illustrative scenario. Not a prediction. Not financial advice.

Monitor data as of Sep 24, 2026 · Trade vintage 2024 · Scoring v3.2

What if energy infrastructure gets hit next? | Morrowfly